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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
COWEN, Circuit Judge. 
 
This appeal concerns, among other issues, the extent of 
a consumer reporting agency's obligation, pursuant to 
section 611(a) of the Fair Credit Reporting Act ("FCRA"), 15 
U.S.C. § 1681i(a) (1982), to conduct a reasonable 
reinvestigation of information on a consumer's credit report 
alleged by the consumer to be inaccurate. We hold that the 
district court erred to the extent that it concluded as a 
matter of law that defendant Trans Union Corporation 
("TUC") fulfilled its obligation under § 1681i(a). Therefore, 
we will reverse and remand the district court's grant of 
judgment as a matter of law on plaintiff-appellant Jennifer 
Cushman's claim for negligent noncompliance with that 
section. 
 
We also hold that Cushman has produced sufficient 
evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that she 
has proved the publication element of her defamation claim 
and her claims pursuant to the Vermont Fair Credit 
Reporting Act ("VFCRA"), VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, §§ 2480a et 
seq. (1993). We will reverse and remand the district court's 
grant of judgment as a matter of law on those claims. 
Finally, we remand to the district court to determine 
whether Cushman has produced evidence sufficient to 
justify an award of punitive damages and to avoid 




To the extent the facts are disputed, we view them in the 
light most favorable to Cushman. Cushman has a 
permanent residence in Pennsylvania but attended college 
in Vermont during the time period pertinent to this 
litigation. In the summer of 1993, an unknown person, 
possibly a member of her household in Philadelphia, 
applied under Cushman's name for credit cards from three 
credit grantors: American Express ("Amex"), Citibank Visa 
("Citibank"), and Chase Manhattan Bank ("Chase"). The 
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person provided the credit grantors with Cushman's social 
security number, address, and other identifying 
information. Credit cards were issued to that person in 
Cushman's name, and that person accumulated balances 
totaling approximately $2400 on the cards between June of 
1993 and April of 1994. All this occurred without 
Cushman's knowledge. 
 
In August of 1994, an unidentified bill collector informed 
Cushman that TUC was publishing a consumer credit 
report indicating that she was delinquent on payments to 
these three credit grantors. Cushman notified TUC that she 
had not applied for or used the three credit cards in 
question, and suggested that a third party had fraudulently 
applied for and obtained the cards. In response, a TUC 
clerk called Amex and Chase to inquire whether the 
verifying information (such as Cushman's name, social 
security number, and address) in Amex's and Chase's 
records matched the information in the TUC report. The 
TUC clerk also asked if Cushman had opened a fraud 
investigation with the credit grantors. Because the 
information matched, and because Cushman had not 
opened a fraud investigation, the information remained in 
the TUC report. TUC was unable to contact Citibank so 
TUC deleted the Citibank entry from the report. TUC's 
investigations are performed by clerks paid $7.50 per hour 
and who are expected to perform ten investigations per 
hour. 
 
There is no evidence that TUC took the necessary steps 
to obtain access to pertinent documents from the credit 
grantors that would enable TUC to perform a handwriting 
comparison. TUC did allow Cushman the opportunity to 
complete a form requesting that a special handling 
statement be placed on her report, and that form required 
her signature. However, a TUC employee testified that the 
form would not have been used for a handwriting 
comparison had Cushman completed it. TUC advises 
consumers in Cushman's position to communicate with the 
credit grantors and complete signature verifications and 
affidavits of fraud with the credit grantors. 
 
Cushman was sent a copy of the updated report still 
containing the Amex and Chase delinquencies. She sent a 
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second letter to TUC reiterating her disagreement with the 
facts contained in the report and offering to sign affidavits 
for TUC to the effect that the delinquencies were not hers. 
TUC subsequently performed a reinvestigation identical to 
the first one but did nothing more. The credit report was 
not changed. At no time did TUC provide Cushman with a 
description of its reinvestigation procedures. 
 
Cushman brought this action in the district court 
alleging negligent and willful failure to reinvestigate the 
disputed entries in violation of sections 611(a), 616, and 
617 of the FCRA, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681i(a), 1681n, 1681o; 
violations of the VFCRA, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, §§ 2480a et 
seq.; and defamation. Subsequently, in April of 1995, TUC 
verified the information with Citibank, and placed the 
Citibank entry back onto Cushman's report. TUC notified 
Cushman of the reinsertion through her attorneys. 
 
That September, Cushman for the first time disputed the 
delinquencies with the three credit grantors. A Citibank 
employee, comparing a handwriting sample provided by 
Cushman with the credit card application, determined that 
the card had been fraudulently obtained. The other two 
credit grantors came to a similar conclusion. TUC has since 
deleted the entries from Cushman's report. 
 
TUC subsequently moved for summary judgment 
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56, raising several issues 
addressed by this appeal. The district court denied the 
motion. See Cushman v. Trans Union Corp., 920 F. Supp. 
80, 83-84 (E.D. Pa. 1996). However, at the close of 
Cushman's presentation of her case at trial, the district 
court sua sponte granted TUC judgment as a matter of law 







As this Court recently wrote: 
 
The FCRA was enacted in order to ensure that 
"consumer reporting agencies adopt reasonable 
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procedures for meeting the needs of commerce for 
consumer credit, personnel, insurance, and other 
information in a manner which is fair and equitable to 
the consumer, with regard to the confidentiality, 
accuracy, relevancy, and proper utilization of such 
information." The FCRA was prompted by 
"congressional concern over abuses in the credit 
reporting industry." In the FCRA, Congress has 
recognized the crucial role that consumer reporting 
agencies play in collecting and transmitting consumer 
credit information, and the detrimental effects 
inaccurate information can visit upon both the 
individual consumer and the nation's economy as a 
whole. 
 
Philbin v. Trans Union Corp., 101 F.3d 957, 962 (3d Cir. 
1996) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1681(b) and Guimond v. Trans 
Union Credit Information Co., 45 F.3d 1329, 1333 (9th Cir. 
1995)) (citations omitted). 
 
Title 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a) provides in relevant part: 
 
If the completeness or accuracy of any item of 
information contained in [her] file is disputed by a 
consumer, and such dispute is directly conveyed to the 
consumer reporting agency by the consumer, the 
consumer reporting agency shall within a reasonable 
period of time reinvestigate and record the current 
status of that information unless it has reasonable 
grounds to believe that the dispute by the consumer is 
frivolous or irrelevant. If after such reinvestigation such 
information is found to be inaccurate or can no longer 
be verified, the consumer reporting agency shall 
promptly delete such information. 
 
"Sections 1681n and 1681o of Title 15 respectively 
provide private rights of action for willful and negligent 
noncompliance with any duty imposed by the FCRA and 
allow recovery for actual damages and attorneys' fees and 
costs, as well as punitive damages in the case of willful 
noncompliance." Philbin, 101 F.3d at 962.1 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The Fair Credit Reporting Act has since been amended, effective 
September 30, 1997, by the Consumer Credit Reporting Reform Act of 
1996, Pub. Law 104-208, Div. A, Title II, §§ 2401 et seq., 110 Stat. 3009, 
___-___. The amendments are not relevant to the issues raised in this 
appeal. 
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1. 
 
As an initial matter, we reject the suggestion made by 
TUC that no cause of action lies pursuant to § 1681i(a) on 
the ground that § 1681i(b) and (c) provide the exclusive 
remedy when a consumer disputes information that has 
been placed on her credit report. Those subsections provide 
that in the event a dispute under subsection (a) is not 
resolved, "the consumer may file a brief statement setting 
forth the nature of the dispute," 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(b), and 
the statement or a summary must be included in the 
consumer's credit report. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(c). 
 
Subsections (b) and (c) have not been read as providing 
the exclusive remedy for a consumer in Cushman's 
position. See Henson v. CSC Credit Servs., 29 F.3d 280, 
286 (7th Cir. 1994); Cahlin v. General Motors Acceptance 
Corp., 936 F.2d 1151, 1160 (11th Cir. 1991); Pinner v. 
Schmidt, 805 F.2d 1258, 1261-62 (5th Cir. 1986); see also 
Guimond, 45 F.3d at 1335 (dictum); cf. Thompson v. San 
Antonio Retail Merchants Assoc., 682 F.2d 509, 514-15 (5th 
Cir. 1982) (consumer need not pursue remedies under 
§ 1681i before suing under § 1681e). The obligations 
prescribed by subsections (b) and (c) are triggered only after 
"the reinvestigation [pursuant to subsection (a)] does not 
resolve the dispute." 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(b). This presupposes 
that a reasonable reinvestigation has already been 
completed and the dispute nonetheless remains unresolved. 
See Guimond, 45 F.3d at 1335. A consumer alleging that no 
reasonable reinvestigation has taken place has a separate 




We now turn to the questions of a consumer reporting 
agency's obligations pursuant to § 1681i(a) and a plaintiff 's 
burden of proving a claim of negligent noncompliance with 
that section. TUC contends that § 1681i(a) did not impose 
on it an obligation to do any more than perform the 
reinvestigation it performed in this case. That is, TUC 
believes that when a consumer informs a consumer 
reporting agency that information contained in her 
consumer report is inaccurate, the consumer reporting 
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agency is obliged only to confirm the accuracy of the 
information with the original source of the information. 
According to TUC, it is never required to go beyond the 
original source in ascertaining whether the information is 
accurate. 
 
This position has been rejected by the United States 
Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and Seventh Circuits. See 
Henson, 29 F.3d at 286-87; Stevenson v. TRW Inc., 987 
F.2d 288, 293 (5th Cir. 1993). In Henson, a state court 
judgment docket erroneously stated that an outstanding 
judgment had been entered against the plaintiff. Two credit 
reporting agencies included the erroneous entry on their 
consumer reports regarding the plaintiff. See Henson, 29 
F.3d at 282-83. The plaintiff sued those credit reporting 
agencies pursuant to both § 1681e(b) and § 1681i. See id. at 
284, 286. Section 1681e(b) requires consumer reporting 
agencies "to follow `reasonable procedures to assure 
maximum possible accuracy' of the information" contained 
in the credit report. Id. at 284 (quoting 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1681e(b)). 
 
The Seventh Circuit upheld the district court's dismissal 
of the § 1681e(b) claim. See id. at 285-86. However, the 
court reversed the district court's dismissal of the § 1681i 
claim, distinguishing between the duties imposed by the 
two sections of the statute. It stated: 
 
A credit reporting agency that has been notified of 
potentially inaccurate information in a consumer's 
credit report is in a very different position than one 
who has no such notice. . . . [A] credit reporting agency 
may initially rely on public court documents, because 
to require otherwise would be burdensome and 
inefficient. However, such exclusive reliance may not be 
justified once the credit reporting agency receives notice 
that the consumer disputes information contained in his 
credit report. When a credit reporting agency receives 
such notice, it can target its resources in a more 
efficient manner and conduct a more thorough 
investigation. 
 
Id. at 286-87 (emphasis added). 
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The Fifth Circuit came to a similar conclusion in 
Stevenson, 987 F.2d at 293. In that case, similar to the 
situation here, the consumer's son had fraudulently 
obtained accounts in the consumer's name. See id. at 291. 
Other inaccurate information appeared on the credit report 
as well. See id. The credit reporting agency sent written 
forms to the credit granting agencies that had originally 
supplied information concerning the consumer, and relied 
on those credit grantors to make the conclusive 
determination of whether the information was accurate. See 
id. at 293. Holding that this was insufficient, the court 
wrote: "In a reinvestigation of the accuracy of credit reports 
[pursuant to § 1681i(a)], a credit bureau must bear some 
responsibility for evaluating the accuracy of information 
obtained from subscribers." Id. (citing Swoager v. Credit 
Bureau of Greater St. Petersburg, 608 F. Supp. 972, 976 
(M.D. Fla. 1985)). 
 
The court reasoned that such a result was the only one 
consistent with the language of § 1681i(a), which requires 
"that the `consumer reporting agency shall within a 
reasonable period of time reinvestigate' and `promptly 
delete' inaccurate or unverifiable information." Id. (quoting 
15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a)) (emphasis in Stevenson). The court 
expressly rejected the same argument made here by TUC: 
"that where fraud has occurred, the consumer must resolve 
the problem with the creditor." Id. Rather, "[t]he statute 
places the burden of investigation squarely on" the 
consumer reporting agency. Id. 
 
We agree with the conclusions reached by these courts. 
We assume for the sake of argument, as the Seventh 
Circuit concluded, that the costs of requiring consumer 
reporting agencies to go beyond the original source of 
information as an initial matter outweigh any potential 
benefits of such a requirement. Thus, we can assume that 
absent any indication that the information is inaccurate, 
the statute does not mandate such an investigation. 
However, as the Henson court explained, once a claimed 
inaccuracy is pinpointed, a consumer reporting agency 
conducting further investigation incurs only the cost of 
reinvestigating that one piece of disputed information. In 
short, when one goes from the § 1681e(b) investigation to 
 
                                8 
the § 1681i(a) reinvestigation, the likelihood that the cost- 
benefit analysis will shift in favor of the consumer increases 
markedly. Judgment as a matter of law, even if appropriate 
on a § 1681e(b) claim, thus may not be warranted on a 
§ 1681i(a) claim. 
 
We also agree with the cogent observation by the Fifth 
Circuit that the plain language of the statute places the 
burden of reinvestigation on the consumer reporting 
agency. See Stevenson, 987 F.2d at 293. The FCRA evinces 
Congress's intent that consumer reporting agencies, having 
the opportunity to reap profits through the collection and 
dissemination of credit information, bear "grave 
responsibilities," 15 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(4), to ensure the 
accuracy of that information. The "grave responsibilit[y]" 
imposed by § 1681i(a) must consist of something more than 
merely parroting information received from other sources. 
Therefore, a "reinvestigation" that merely shifts the burden 
back to the consumer and the credit grantor cannot fulfill 
the obligations contemplated by the statute. 
 
In addition to these observations, we note that TUC's 
reading of § 1681i(a) would require it only to replicate the 
efforts it must undertake in order to comply with 
§ 1681e(b). Such a reading would render the two sections 
largely duplicative of each other. We strive to avoid a result 
that would render statutory language superfluous, 
meaningless, or irrelevant. See Sekula v. F.D.I.C., 39 F.3d 
448, 454 n.14 (3d Cir. 1994); Pennsylvania Dept. of Public 
Welfare v. United States Dept. of Health and Human Servs., 
928 F.2d 1378, 1385 (3d Cir. 1991). 
 
TUC contends that Podell v. Citicorp Diners Club, Inc., 
Nos. 96-7246, 314, 1997 WL 220320 (2d Cir. May 5, 1997), 
compels that we affirm. TUC is mistaken. In Podell, after 
being notified by a consumer of a dispute, a consumer 
reporting agency had performed the same sort of 
perfunctory reinvestigation that TUC performed here. See 
id. at *3. As here, the consumer sued the consumer 
reporting agency pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1681i. See id.2 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Podell also concerned a claim against a different consumer reporting 
agency pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b). That portion of the opinion is 
not relevant to our discussion. 
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However, the consumer in Podell did not contend that the 
extent of the reinvestigation was unreasonably narrow, as 
Cushman argues here. Rather, the consumer's position in 
that case was that the consumer reporting agency never 
sent him an updated credit report or any other notice that 
a reinvestigation had been performed. See id. Therefore, he 
argued, he never had an opportunity to place a statement 
of dispute in his file pursuant to § 1681i(b) and (c). See id. 
As the consumer in Podell never took issue with the 
reasonableness of the scope of the consumer reporting 
agency's reinvestigation, the Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit had no occasion to address this issue. 
 
We hold that in order to fulfill its obligation under 
§ 1681i(a) "a credit reporting agency may be required, in 
certain circumstances, to verify the accuracy of its initial 
source of information." Henson, 29 F.3d at 287. We further 
hold that "[w]hether the credit reporting agency has a duty 
to go beyond the original source will depend" on a number 
of factors. Id. One of these is "whether the consumer has 
alerted the reporting agency to the possibility that the 
source may be unreliable or the reporting agency itself 
knows or should know that the source is unreliable." Id. A 
second factor is "the cost of verifying the accuracy of the 
source versus the possible harm inaccurately reported 
information may cause the consumer." Id. Whatever 
considerations exist, it is for "the trier of fact [to] weigh 
the[se] factors in deciding whether [the defendant] violated 
the provisions of section 1681i." Id. 
 
In this case, the district court initially denied TUC's 
motion for summary judgment and relied on Henson in 
doing so, stating: 
 
The scope of the agency's duty to reinvestigate depends 
upon (1) the cost of verifying the accuracy of the source 
versus the potential harm to the consumer; and (2) the 
extent of the information the credit reporting agency 
possesses. . . . Once the credit reporting agency 
receives . . . notice [from the consumer that the credit 
report is inaccurate] it may be required to conduct a 
more thorough investigation, one that requires it to 
make inquiries beyond the original source of the 
information. . . . 
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 . . . [T]he decisive inquiry is whether Trans Union 
could have determined that the accounts were opened 
fraudulently if it had reasonably investigated the 
matter. 
 
Cushman, 920 F. Supp. at 83 (citing Henson, 29 F.3d at 
286-87). 
 
This was in accord with our holding today. However, after 
the close of plaintiff 's case the court stated, without further 
elaboration: 
 
I have entertained the evidence in this case to this 
point, and I tell you I am not persuaded that the 
plaintiff has met [her] burden to this Court in any 
claim that is before it at this juncture. 
 
 Based on that, I'm going to grant a 50(a) motion in 
favor of the defendant. 
 
App. at 256-57. As far as we can tell, the evidence before 
the court on defendant's summary judgment motion was 
not materially different from the evidence produced at trial. 
Most importantly, there was evidence produced at trial 
concerning the inaccuracy of the information, Cushman's 
notification to TUC of the inaccuracy and the underlying 
fraud, the nature of TUC's reinvestigation and the costs 
incurred by it in performing that reinvestigation, and the 
damages suffered by Cushman. 
 
A reasonable jury weighing this evidence in light of the 
factors identified in Henson and endorsed by us today 
could have rendered a verdict for Cushman. The jury could 
have concluded that after TUC was alerted to the 
accusation that the accounts were obtained fraudulently, 
and then confronted with the credit grantors' reiteration of 
the inaccurate information, TUC should have known that 
the credit grantors were "unreliable" to the extent that they 
had not been informed of the fraud. See Henson, 29 F.3d at 
286; see also Pinner, 805 F.2d at 1262 (where consumer 
informed consumer reporting agency of his personal 
dispute with manager of credit grantor, it was unreasonable 
under § 1681i(a) for consumer reporting agency to rely 
solely on manager for information); cf. Bryant v. TRW, Inc., 
689 F.2d 72, 79 (6th Cir. 1982) (similar efforts insufficient 
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under § 1681e(b)). Similarly, the jury could have concluded 
that seventy-five cents per investigation was too little to 
spend when weighed against Cushman's damages. See 
Henson, 29 F.3d at 287. It was for "the trier of fact [to] 
weigh the[se] factors." Id. (emphasis added). The district 
court arrogated that role to itself, and in doing so, it erred. 
Therefore, the judgment of the district court granting 
judgment as a matter of law on Cushman's claim for 





Cushman also claims that she is entitled to punitive 
damages pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1681n because TUC's 
alleged noncompliance with § 1681i(a) was willful. "To show 
willful noncompliance with the FCRA, [Cushman] must 
show that [TUC] `knowingly and intentionally committed an 
act in conscious disregard for the rights of others,' but need 
not show `malice or evil motive.' " Philbin, 101 F.3d at 970 
(quoting Pinner, 805 F.2d at 1263). The Fifth Circuit has 
held that "[o]nly defendants who have engaged in `willful 
misrepresentations or concealments' have committed a 
willful violation and are subject to punitive damages under 
§ 1681n." Stevenson, 987 F.2d at 294 (quoting Pinner, 805 
F.2d at 1263). Other courts have allowed punitive damages 
in cases involving concealments or misrepresentations 
without necessarily limiting the availability of punitive 
damages to such cases. See, e.g., Millstone v. O'Hanlon 
Reports, Inc., 528 F.2d 829, 834 (8th Cir. 1976); Collins v. 
Retail Credit Co., 410 F. Supp. 924, 931-32 (E.D. Mich. 
1976). 
 
Although we decline to adopt the Fifth Circuit's holding 
in Stevenson, we conclude that to justify an award of 
punitive damages, a defendant's actions must be on the 
same order as willful concealments or misrepresentations. 
If Cushman can prove, as she argues, that TUC adopted its 
reinvestigation policy either knowing that policy to be in 
contravention of the rights possessed by consumers 
pursuant to the FCRA or in reckless disregard of whether 
the policy contravened those rights, she may be awarded 
punitive damages. 
 
                                12 
The district court concluded that Cushman had not made 
out a case even of negligent noncompliance with § 1681i(a). 
It therefore did not consider whether she had shown TUC's 
alleged noncompliance to be willful. Because the district 
court is more intimately familiar with the record in this 
matter, it is better situated than we to determine whether 
Cushman has produced sufficient evidence for a reasonable 
jury to find willfulness on the part of TUC pursuant to the 
standards we have set forth above. Therefore we will 




Cushman also claims that TUC has violated the VFCRA. 
Vermont Statutes Annotated Title 9, § 2480d is similar to 
15 U.S.C. § 1681i, providing, in pertinent part: 
 
(a) If the completeness or accuracy of any item of 
information contained in the consumer's file is 
disputed by the consumer and the consumer notifies 
the credit reporting agency directly of such dispute, the 
agency shall reinvestigate free of charge and record the 
current status of the disputed information on or before 
30 business days after the date the agency receives 
notice from the consumer. 
 
. . . . 
 
(e) If, after a reinvestigation under subsection (a) of 
this section of any information disputed by the 
consumer, the information is found to be inaccurate or 
cannot be verified, the credit reporting agency shall 
promptly delete such information from the consumer's 
file. . . . 
 
(f) If any information is deleted after a reinvestigation 
under subsection (a) of this section, the information 
may not be reinserted in the consumer's file after 
deletion unless the person who furnishes the 
information reinvestigates and states in writing or by 
electronic record to the agency that the information is 
complete and accurate. . . . Upon such reinvestigation 
and statement by the furnisher, the credit reporting 
agency shall promptly notify the consumer of any 
reinsertion. 
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(g) A credit reporting agency shall provide written 
notice of the results of any reinvestigation under this 
subsection [which] shall include: 
 
. . . . 
 
(5) a description of the procedure used to determine 
the accuracy and completeness of the information, 
including the name, business address, and, if 
available, the telephone number of any person 




As a threshold matter, we must determine whether 
Cushman's relation to the state of Vermont is sufficient to 
bestow on her the protections of the VFCRA. Vermont 
Statutes Annotated Title 9, section 2480a(1) defines 
"consumer" as "a natural person residing in this state." 
Thus, we must determine, pursuant to Vermont law, 
whether Cushman "resid[ed]" in that state for purposes of 
the statute. We have stated that "the term `resident' has no 
precise meaning. Rather, its definition varies with each 
statutory usage." Government of Virgin Islands ex rel. Bodin 
v. Brathwaite, 459 F.2d 543, 544 (3d Cir. 1972) (citations 
omitted); see also Willenbrock v. Rogers, 255 F.2d 236, 237 
(3d Cir. 1958); United States v. Stabler, 169 F.2d 995, 998 
(3d Cir. 1948). Unfortunately, the word "residing" is not 
defined in the VFCRA and we have uncovered no cases 
addressing what constitutes residency for purposes of the 
VFCRA. 
 
It is perhaps telling that the Vermont legislature left the 
word "residing" undefined in the VFCRA. It could have 
rendered a technical definition of residency for these 
purposes as it has for state income tax purposes. See VT. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 5811(11)(A). Alternatively, it could have 
issued guidelines for the use of a state agency or the courts 
to establish their own definition of residency for these 
purposes, as it has for purposes of determining who is 
entitled to lowered tuition rates at state-supported 
institutions of higher learning. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit.16, 
§§ 2282, 2282a. 
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Because it did neither of these things, we conclude that 
the Vermont legislature intended "residing" in VT. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 9, § 2480a(1) to have its common legal meaning. In 
ordinary legal parlance, residency merely means "living in a 
particular locality" but not necessarily with the intent to 
make that locality "a fixed and permanent home." BLACK'S 
LAW DICTIONARY 1308-09 (6th ed. 1990); see also Wolinsky v. 
Bradford Nat'l Bank, 34 B.R. 702, 704 (D. Vt. 1983) 
(pursuant to Vermont law, " `[d]omicile' . . . means living in 
a locality with the intent to make it a fixed and permanent 
home, while `residence' simply requires bodily presence as 
an inhabitant in a given place") (citation omitted); Piche v. 
Department of Taxes, 565 A.2d 1283, 1285 (Vt. 1989) 
(residence is something less than domicile); Walker v. 
Walker, 200 A.2d 267, 269 (Vt. 1964) (same). But cf. 
Bonneau v. Russell, 85 A.2d 569, 570 (Vt. 1952) (equating 
residency and domicile for purposes of VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, 
§ 2713).3 On the other hand, residency implies something 
more than "merely transitory in nature," such as the 
happenstance of passing through a state on one's way to 
some other destination. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY at 1309 
(defining "resident"); see also Guessefeldt v. McGrath, 342 
U.S. 308, 312, 72 S.Ct. 338, 341 (1951) (residence, for 
purposes of Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917, 50 U.S.C. 
App. § 2(a) (1990), "implies something more than mere 
physical presence and something less than domicile"). 
 
Brathwaite is instructive in this regard. In that case, we 
were charged with the task of interpreting the word 
"resident" in V.I. CODE ANN . tit. 16, § 291(a) (1995), in order 
to determine whether the petitioner could bring a paternity 
proceeding under that section. As in this case, we had little 
guidance in that endeavor. We noted that "residence may 
be taken to indicate merely one's momentary factual place 
of abode." Brathwaite, 459 F.2d at 544. We held that 
physical presence in a locality "coupled with [an] intent to 
remain there for a measurable period of time," satisfied the 
statute's requirement of residency. Id. at 544-45. We 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Bonneau v. Russell, 85 A.2d 569, 570 (Vt. 1952), has been criticized 
for "fail[ing] to recognize the distinction in Vermont law between 
residence and domicile." Wolinsky v. Bradford Nat'l Bank, 34 B.R. 702, 
704 n.1 (D. Vt. 1983). 
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further concluded that the four-month period during which 
the petitioner had continuously lived in the Virgin Islands 
prior to the conclusion of the trial in that case sufficed to 
confer resident status upon her. See id. at 545. Thus, to be 
a resident of a locale, one need intend to live there not 
permanently nor indefinitely, but only "for a measurable 
period of time." Id. Moreover, presence for a period as short 
as four months will suffice. See also Stabler, 169 F.2d at 
998 (defendant's "presence in New Jersey over a period of 
weeks . . . was sufficient to give him a residence in New 
Jersey" for purposes of 8 U.S.C. § 738(b) (repealed 1952), 
relating to revocation of naturalization). 
 
The record reflects that during the period that TUC 
allegedly failed to fulfill its obligations pursuant to the 
VFCRA (roughly from the autumn of 1994 through the 
spring of 1995), Cushman was in her senior year at the 
University of Vermont in Burlington. See App. at 147-56. It 
appears that she had been living in Vermont at least since 
the summer of 1993, except for "a brief few days at the end 
of the summer." Id. at 148. Moreover, she still lived in 
Vermont at the time of trial, in the spring of 1996. See id. 
at 147. The jury could reasonably infer from the evidence 
that, at the time of TUC's alleged violation of the VFCRA, (1) 
Cushman had already lived in Vermont for over a year, and 
(2) she intended to remain in Vermont at least until she 
graduated from the University and perhaps indefinitely. 
Thus, there was sufficient evidence from which a 
reasonable jury could conclude that Cushman was 
"residing" in Vermont during the relevant time period, 
pursuant to the ordinary legal meaning of that term. A jury 
could therefore conclude that Cushman may invoke the 
protections of the VFCRA.4 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 105 S.Ct. 2174 (1985), 
and International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S.Ct. 154 
(1945), cited by TUC, are inapposite. The question raised is whether 
Cushman may invoke the protections of a Vermont statute, regardless of 
where the action is brought. This issue is entirely separate and distinct 
from the question whether a state or federal court located in Vermont 
would be able, consistent with due process principles, to assert personal 
jurisdiction over TUC. 
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2. 
 
Cushman claims that TUC violated VT. S TAT. ANN. tit. 9, 
§ 2480d(f), by not "promptly notify[ing]" her of the 
reinsertion of the Citibank entry. A TUC employee testified 
that it did notify her through her attorneys, see App. at 
223-24, and Cushman has pointed to no contrary evidence 
in the record. Cushman claims that this notification 
occurred only during discovery in this litigation and 
therefore was not sufficiently "prompt[ ]" to satisfy 
§ 2480d(f). The record does not indicate when the 
notification was made to Cushman's attorneys. Accordingly, 
we cannot conclude as a matter of law that TUC fulfilled its 
obligations pursuant to that section. The district court's 
grant of judgment as a matter of law on this claim will be 
reversed and remanded for a jury determination of whether 





Cushman also claims that TUC violated VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 
9, § 2480d(g)(5), by not providing her with a description of 
its reinvestigation procedures. There is evidence that TUC 
did fail in this regard. See App. at 224-26. Therefore 
Cushman's claim pursuant to that section of the VFCRA 
must stand, as must her claims under those portions of the 
VFCRA that merely duplicate the FCRA.5  
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. TUC contends that the VFCRA claim should be dismissed on the 
additional ground that Cushman proved no damages stemming from the 
alleged violation of that statute. TUC points to a "concession" by 
Cushman's counsel in the district court that Cushman has not "pointed 
to any damage evidence specifically [with regard] to" the Vermont 
statute. App. at 260. As we read this, however, it appears that counsel 
merely stated that any damages caused by the alleged violations of the 
VFCRA were identical to those caused by the alleged violations of the 
FCRA. Thus, TUC's contention that Cushman conceded away any claim 
that she was damaged by a violation of the VFCRA is meritless. 
 





The district court dismissed Cushman's defamation claim 
on the ground that she had not produced any evidence of 
malice and because the FCRA preempts state law 
defamation claims except where the plaintiff proves "malice 
or willful intent to injure" her. 15 U.S.C. § 1681h(e); see 
Bloom v. I.C. Sys., Inc., 972 F.2d 1067, 1069 (9th Cir. 
1992); Thornton v. Equifax, Inc., 619 F.2d 700, 703 (8th Cir. 
1980). The parties have assumed that a showing of "malice 
or willful intent to injure" pursuant to § 1681h(e) is 
identical to proof of willfulness under § 1681n. This is 
contrary to the holding of the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in Thornton, 619 F.2d at 706, 
that § 1681h(e) establishes a "higher requirement of proof." 
However, because neither the parties nor the district court 
addressed this issue, we will assume without deciding that 
the requirements for the two showings are identical. We 
have explained above that we will remand to the district 
court for a determination of whether Cushman has 
produced evidence sufficient to justify a finding of 
willfulness on the part of TUC pursuant to § 1681n. See 
Part II.A.3 supra. We must likewise remand for a 
determination of whether Cushman has produced evidence 
of "malice or willful intent to injure" sufficient to avoid 




The district court granted TUC judgment as a matter of 
law on Cushman's defamation claim on the alternative 
ground that she had not produced any evidence of 
publication. In order to prove defamation pursuant to 
Pennsylvania law,6 Cushman must prove, inter alia, 
publication of the defamatory matter by TUC. See 42 PA. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. Neither party has argued that the defamation claim is governed by the 
laws of Vermont or any other jurisdiction. In the absence of such a 
contention, we apply the laws of the forum state. See Publicker Indus., 
Inc. v. Roman Ceramics Corp., 652 F.2d 340, 343 n.6 (3d Cir. 1981). 
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CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8343(a)(2) (1982); U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v. 
Blue Cross of Greater Philadelphia, 898 F.2d 914, 923 (3d 
Cir. 1990); Ertel v. Patriot-News Co., 674 A.2d 1038, 1043 
(Pa.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. #6D6D 6D#, 117 S.Ct. 512 (1996). 
Publication consists of the communication of the 
information to at least one person other than the person 
defamed. See Flaxman v. Burnett, 574 A.2d 1061, 1066 (Pa. 
Super. 1990). 
 
A TUC employee testified that the allegedly defamatory 
information was published to Chase and Citibank. See App. 
at 222, 338-39. Moreover, Cushman testified that an 
unidentified bill collector initially informed her of the 
allegedly defamatory information, from which a jury could 
infer that the information had been published to him as 
well. See id. at 149. A reasonable jury could conclude that 
Cushman has satisfied the publication element of her 
defamation cause of action.7 Thus, this was not a proper 
basis upon which to grant TUC judgment as a matter of law 




The judgment of the district court will be reversed and 
remanded for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
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Teste: 
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7. We express no opinion as to whether Cushman has set forth evidence 
sufficient to prove the other elements of her defamation claim. 
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